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Abstract—In this article, we propose a mainly-software harden-
ing technique to totally protect unmodified running operating
systems on COTS hardware against transient errors in heavily
radiation - flooded environment like high altitude space. The
technique is currently being implemented in a hypervisor and
allows to control the upper layers of the software stack (operating
system and applications). The rest of the system, the hypervisor,
will be protected by other means, thus resulting in a completely
protected system against transient errors. The induced overhead
turns around 200% but this is expected to decrease with future
improvements.
Index Terms—Transient errors, hypervisor, operating system,
fault tolerance.
I. INTRODUCTION
A transient error is a change of state of a logical node
in an electronic component (0 to 1 or 1 to 0) due to
interaction between ionizing particles contained in cosmic
rays and silicon atoms which generally compose integrated
circuits. Although these errors do not damage the circuit,
they may cause crashes, hangs and sometimes even erroneous
results in Operating Systems (OS) and applications running
on ordinary unprotected processors [1]. Therefore, for critical
missions, ordinary equipment may not be used in an radiation-
flooded environment without special care. Even though they
are generally cheaper than hardware-hardened circuits because
the latter are manufactured in little series for niche markets.
In this article, we present a technique, still under research,
that combines software redundancy with usual functionalities
of ordinary hardware (blended technique) in order to totally
protect operating systems running on these COTS1 materials
against transient errors. In the first part of this article, we
present the technique in more detail, after specifying the
objective of this work, then we will give some results we
achieved so far.
II. BLENDED HARDENING CONCEPT
A. Objective
We propose to use some of the functionalities of ordinary
hardware to detect and inhibit errors that occur in the circuit
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based on redundancy of execution. This is a Blended Harden-
ing Technique (BHT) that allows to protect a full computing
system at runtime with no need to access its source code.
B. Blended hardening technique : Background
Considering a running program which is a long stream of
machine instructions, the BHT here consists of:
• splitting, during execution, each program to be hardened
into small sets of subsequent instructions called Process-
ing Elements (PE),
• running them twice,
• and comparing their execution traces to detect any occur-
ring errors.
The Fig.1a gives a conceptual view of how each PE is
processed. When errors are detected, the execution is simply
rejected and the processing is resumed from the last correct
execution point. The two execution have the same effect as
the initial single execution. The PE is idempotent and its
processing is atomic. For this to hold, the BHT sets two
postulates:
• Firstly, zero or at most one transient error per treatment:
Thus, if there is an error, it would be either during the
first execution, or during the second execution, or during
the verification/commit phase, but never two or all phases
will be erroneous. The statistical study in [2] has shown
that transient errors in an radiated environment follow
the Poissons law. So, A maximum time interval, during
which there can be no more than one transient error, can
be deduced; no matter when the interval is taken.
• Secondly, a central memory, fully immune against tran-
sient errors, is necessary in order to preserve all data,
coming from an error-free execution and saved in the
main memory, from erroneous alteration. In this way one
is sure to always start the processing of a PE from reliable
data. The manner of obtaining such kind of memory from
ordinary materials will not be discussed in this paper.
This model has been formally proven in [3]. In this article,
such an interval had been calculated for a Leon processor
(10µs) and a stand-alone program had been hardened by
Lesage et al, using the BHT.
As the results were encouraging, the following step was to
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(a) Schematic view of PE execution (b) micro-hypervisor global architecture
Fig. 1. PE processing and Hypervisor view
bring this technique to a more complex environment such
as multitasking OS. This work is undergoing research where
the kernel of Minix is being modified to harden its user
applications that run on top of it [4]. The hardening module
being incorporated in the core, the OS itself remains thus un-
protected. That’s why we are searching to completely protect
the OS, using a hypervisor (Nova [5]) essentially because of
its inherent ability to manipulate OS.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Hypervisor based hardening
A hypervisor is software that runs directly on the hardware
and can host one or more OS(s) in virtual machines. Thanks
to the hypervisor, OSs run identically as if they were running
on a bare machine (confer Fig. 1b). Above the hypervisor and
in user mode is the program called VMM (Virtual Machine
Monitor) which is actually a set of system programs. Its role
is to control, and emulate the virtual machine on which the
guest system believes it is running.
B. Approach
To achieve this, we have subdivided the work into three
steps:
• Harden programs in the VMM
• Harden of OSs running on top of them
• Harden the hypervisors layer: but this last part is identical
to the hardening of the standalone program Lesage had
already achieved [3]. The hypervisor is also a standalone
program that runs on the bare machine with the source
code at disposal.
IV. MID-TERM RESULTS
The first part of the work is currently finished, with the
actual hardening of all the system processes in the VMM
completely done. This means that an error that occurs during
the execution of any VMM process is automatically detected
and inhibited. The overhead currently revolves around 2 times
the normal execution in average. As shown in Fig 2a, this
overhead is more severe when the hardened program release
itself the CPU (self-stop) than when we had to interrupt it by
a timer(timer-stop); that is because the PE execution time is
shorter in the first case.
(a) Hardened run vs normal run (b) Blended hardening vs Roman
Fig. 2. BHT compared to normal execution and Romain
V. RELATED WORKS
Other techniques have also been proposed in tis field.
Although Romain [6] ensures an overhead of 30% when all
redundant threads are spread on available CPU cores (Fig.2b),
it does not provide an entire protection against transient errors.
We have not yet tested the BHT but this technique is designed
to provide total protection for unmodified operating systems
at runtime without needing to recompile them.
VI. FUTURS WORKS
The rest of the work will be devoted specifically to the
hardening of the virtualized OS. We will focus on:
• privileged instructions management
• PE delimitation for guest OS and
• management of device drivers contained in guest OSs.
We will then test the system by both simulated transient errors
and exposition to ionizing radiation in space environment to
test it under real conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown in this paper a mainly-software method
to protect the execution of operating systems on ordinary
hardware against transient errors in highly radiation-flooded
environment.
We outlined the level reached and an overview of what remains
to be done. Current level implementation gives a rather encour-
aging overhead and presages of acceptable overhead once the
work will be finished.
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